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South-Central Timber Development, Inc.
v. Wunnicke: The Dormant Commerce

Clause Fells Alaska's Primary Manufacture
Requirement for the Sale of
State-Owned Timber
I.

INTRODUCTION

The commerce clause provides that "Congress shall have Power To
Regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States. . . ."' This language directly indicates that the commerce clause
acts as an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate foreign
...

and interstate commerce. 2 However, the commerce clause has also been
interpreted to act as a limitation on the states' ability to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce where Congress has failed to act. This limitation
is often called the negative or dormant commerce clause.'

1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2. Congress' affirmative power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce
refers to its ability to enact legislation in areas affecting interstate commerce. Congress' power is almost without exception in this area. See Perez v. United States,
402 U.S. 146 (1971) (Congressional regulation of loan sharking activities was upheld
because the loan shark's activities were within a class of activities which adversely
affected interstate commerce.); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (Portions
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act which imposed penalties on farmers who grew
wheat in excess of a quota established by the Act were upheld. The Act was enforced
as to Filburn despite the fact that his wheat was used wholly for his own consumption. The Court held that the potential cumulative effects of home consumption could
adversely affect the interstate market for wheat, and thus the regulation was valid
as applied to Filburn.). But see National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833
(1976) (An amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act which applied the Act's provisions to employees of a state was struck down. The Court recognized that Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce is plenary, but found that the states
were immune from such regulation when making decisions regarding the conduct
of integral governmental functions.).
3. This power acts of its own accord, through judicial determination, to strike
down state action which impermissibly burdens interstate commerce, even though
Congress has not acted to regulate such commerce. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex
rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (A state could not restrict use of ground water
by out-of-state residents just because the other state did not agree to a reciprocity
agreement.); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (A
state could not statutorily require that a private company give a preferred right of
access to hydro-electric power to the state's citizens.); Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (A state could not prohibit the use of a
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Despite the limitation placed on the states' ability to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce, Congress may sanction state action
which would otherwise be an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce. 4 Thus, the negative aspects of the commerce clause are expunged when Congress uses its affirmative power to give the states
regulatory ability they would not otherwise possess.
Counterpoised against the rule that the states cannot impermissibly
burden interstate commerce is the recently announced market-participant
doctrine. Under the market-participant doctrine, state action is removed
from commerce clause scrutiny when the state directly participates in
the interstate market affected.' In applying the market-participant
doctrine, the threshold question is whether the state is acting as a regulator
65-foot double tractor-trailer on highways within the state.); Lewis v. BT Inv.
Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (A state could not prohibit an out-of-state bank
holding company from providing business services which in-state banks could provide.); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (A state could not prohibit out-ofstate residents from exporting in-state minnows.); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617 (1978) (A state could not prohibit the importation of solid or liquid waste
to privately owned in-state landfills.); Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424
U.S. 366 (1976) (A state could not ban importation of out-of-state milk based on
a reciprocity agreement.);. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (A
municipality could not ban importation of out-of-state milk when its avowed local
purpose could be met with a less restrictive means.); H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (A state could not prohibit an out-of-state milk distributor
from selling milk within its borders when the actual purpose was to aid local economic
interests.); Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (A state statute
prohibiting exportation of shrimp from which the heads and hulls had not been removed was struck down because it favored the local canning industry over out-of-state
interests.); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (A state could not
prefer residents over nonresidents as to the sale of privately-owned natural gas.).
4. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648 (1981). Retaliatory taxes imposed on insurance companies were valid even though
the taxes placed a burden on foreign commerce, because Congress had specifically
removed commerce clause limitations on the state's ability to tax and regulate the
insurance industry through passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011
(1982). The McCarran-Ferguson Act was a direct response to the Court's holding
in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), which
held that the states could not burden interstate commerce through regulation of the
insurance industry. The McCarran-Ferguson Act returned the power to regulate the
insurance industry to the states. The Act was upheld in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); see also Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761,
769 (1945) (The Court recognized Congress' power to permit the states to regulate
interstate commerce in areas where it would otherwise be impermissible.).
5. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976). See also White
v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 205 (1983); Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980). Cf. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F.
Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.), aff'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972) (A statute specifying
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or participant in the interstate market.' If the state is acting as a participant rather than a regulator, the state avoids the inquiry into whether
its action burdens interstate commerce. However, the line between
-participation and regulation is not easily drawn."
Recently, the United States Supreme Court addressed issues regarding both the congressional approval aspect of the commerce clause and
the market-participant exception. In South-CentralTimber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke8 the Supreme Court held that an otherwise impermissible state regulation will be removed from commerce clause prohibition by Congress only when it is unmistakably clear that Congress intended to sanction the burden placed on interstate commerce. 9 Then,
the Court held in a plurality opinion" that Alaska was not within the
market-participant exception because three elements were present which
removed the state from the exception.' Finally, the Court struck down
the state regulation, holding that it fell within the rule of virtual per se
invalidity. 'I
that the state use in-state printers to print state documents was not in violation of
the commerce clause.).
6. If the [state] is a market participant, then the Commerce Clause
establishes no barrier . . . . Impact on out-of-state residents figures in the
equation only after it is decided that the [state] is regulating the market
rather than participating in it, for only in the former case need it be determined whether any burden on interstate commerce is permitted by the Commerce Clause.
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 210 (1983).
But see Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980):
The threshold issue is whether [the state] has undertaken integral government operations in an area of traditional governmental functions, or whether
it has participated in the marketplace as a private firm. If the latter
characterization applies, we also must determine whether the State Commission's marketing policy burdens the flow of interstate trade.
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).
7. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
211 n.7 (1983) (Justice Rehnquist declined to define any precise limits on the doctrine.).
8. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
9. Id. at 2242.
10. Id. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court in which Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens joined. Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger, concurred in parts I and II (the congressional approval issue) and
in the judgment, but would have remanded the case to the court of appeals to decide
the market-participant issue and whether the requirement substantially burdened interstate commerce. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented. Justice
Marshall took no part in the decision of the case.
11. Id. at 2245. The three elements were a burden on foreign commerce, the
presence of a natural resource and the existence of restrictions on resale.
12. Id. at 2247. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)
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This casenote will examine the general history and policy supporting
the negative aspects of the commerce clause, including how Congress'
power affects state regulation of interstate commerce. The note will trace
the evolution of the market-participant exception and discuss how it affects commerce clause adjudication. Next, this note will report and
analyze the Wunnicke decision. Finally, possible implications of that decision will be discussed.

II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

The commerce clause has long been held to be an affirmative grant of
power to Congress13 and Congress' power is supreme where it has spoken.'"

However, Congress' right is not exclusive in the regulation of interstate
commerce. ' 5 Early in this nation's history, the Court held that the states
retained some power in the regulation of interstate commerce, but declined to explicitly define the extent of that power.'I Subsequently, using a caseby-case approach, the Court defined an area of interstate commerce in which
the states cannot regulate despite congressional silence.' In this area the
dormant or negative commerce clause acts with a power of its own through
the judiciary to strike down state regulation of transportation, 8 importation
(Prohibition of importation of out-of-state waste to protect in-state economic interests was virtually per se invalid because this type of regulation "overtly blocks
the flow of interstate commerce at a state's borders.").
13. See supra note 2.
14. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (New Jersey and New York
statutes concerning navigation conflicted with a federal statute. The federal statute
was a valid regulation of interstate commerce and the state statutes were void under
the supremacy clause.). See also supra note 2.
15. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852) (The
Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute which required that ships accept local pilots
while passing through the Delaware River at the Port of Philadelphia. The Court
held that the grant of power to Congress did not prevent the states from regulating
"local necessities of navigation.").
16. To these precise questions, which are all we are called on to decide,
this opinion must be understood to be confined. It does not extend to the
question what other subjects, under the commercial power, are within the
exclusive control of Congress, or may be regulated by the States in the
absence of all Congressional legislation; nor to the general question how
far any regulation of a subject by Congress, may be deemed to operate
as an exclusion of all legislation by the States upon the same subject.
Id. at 320.
17. See supra note 3.
18. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (State regulation prohibiting 65-foot double tractor-trailers on state highways was impermissible.); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (Illinois statute requiring contour mudflaps, which was not in line with requirements of other states, plac-
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of goods and resources, 19exportation of goods and resources,'20 and business
arrangements.21
The operation of the dormant commerce clause does not strike down
all state regulation which impacts on interstate commerce. 2 Since the
states can validly regulate some areas of interstate commerce, the Court
developed standards to determine whether a state regulation burdened
interstate commerce in an unconstitutional manner.
The tests devised by the Court consider both the purpose of the state
regulation and the relative burden imposed on interstate commerce. When
the state regulation imposes at least a minimal burden on interstate
commerce and the goal is mere economic protectionism, the Court has
established a rule of per se invalidity. 3 Provided the regulation survives
this threshold test, the Court then balances any legitimate local interest
against the weight of the burden on interstate commerce. 2 This balancing
ed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.).
19. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (New Jersey statute prohibiting importation of solid waste into privately-owned landfills was per se invalid
under the commerce clause.); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n,
432 U.S. 333 (1977) (North Carolina statute requiring that all apples shipped into
the state bear no other grade than the applicable U.S. grade was unconstitutional
in that a nondiscriminatory means was available to effect the purpose of the statute.);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (Mississippi statute requiring that out-of-state companies could ship milk to Mississippi only if their home
state accepted Mississippi's milk on a reciprocal basis was unconstitutional.).
20. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (Nebraska statute
prohibiting export of its ground water unless the receiving state adhered to a reciprocity
agreement unduly burdened interstate commerce.); New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (New Hampshire statute giving its citizens preferred
access to privately owned hydro-electric power did not pass constitutional muster.);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (Oklahoma statute prohibiting the export
of minnows seined in Oklahoma waters was an impermissible burden on interstate
commerce.).
21. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980) (Florida statute prohibiting an out-of-state bank from providing financial services not prohibited as to
in-state banks was unconstitutional under the commerce clause.).
22. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (Minnesota
statute banning the retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers was a valid state regulation. The Court found that the statute did not
discriminate between interstate and intrastate commerce and the burden imposed on
interstate commerce was relatively minor; hence, the statute did not impermissibly
burden interstate commerce in light of the legitimate conservation interest of the state.).
23. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (Prohibition on importation of solid waste was economic protectionism in that its primary effect was
to stabilize waste disposal costs for New Jersey residents at the expense of out-ofstate interests.).
24. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (The Court used a balan-

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

test was expounded by the Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. The test
was articulated as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits ....
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities. 2
Beyond this test, the Court has also noted that the state regulation will
receive greater scrutiny when it implicates foreign commerce. This scrutiny
is measured in terms of preserving the nation's ability to speak with one
voice in matters of international trade.2"
Two separate rationales have been offered in support of using the
dormant commerce clause to strike down state regulation of interstate
commerce. The first rationale stems from the idea that the nation should
function as one economic unit and that free trade among the states should
be encouraged. Recognized early in the nation's history, this theory is
still used by modern-day courts." This rationale was expressed succinctly
by Justice Cardozo when he wrote: "[The Constitution] was framed upon
cing test to strike down an Arizona regulation which required that cantaloupes shipped outside the state be shipped in state-approved containers.).
25. Id. at 142 (footnote omitted).
26. See Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 453 (1979)
(California ad valorem tax on foreign cargo containers was in violation of the commerce clause because its unilateral conduct made it impossible for the federal government to speak with one voice concerning international trade.).
27. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979) (The goal of the commerce clause is to prevent economic balkanization which plagued relations among
the states under the Articles of Confederation.); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 22,
at 144-45 (A. Hamilton) (New American Library ed. 1961) (arguing that trade among
the states should be restrained by a national control). But see Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Eule]
(Professor Eule argues that the free trade rationale is no longer persuasive. He argues
that originally the founders believed that the courts would have to step in to invalidate state regulations which restricted interstate trade because Congress would
be ineffective at establishing an unrestricted interstate trade. However, modernly,
Congress has shown a tremendous ability to regulate interstate trade and is hardly
ineffectual. Therefore, the courts no longer need to protect free trade among the
states.); Anson & Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause and StateOwned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REv. 71, 78-79 n.31 (1982) ("The commerce clause,
by granting Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce, can as fairly be
said to contemplate a regulated market as a free one.").
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the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division.""8
The second rationale in support of using the dormant commerce
clause to strike down state legislation concerns ensuring that all adversely
affected interests have adequate political representation. 19 Under this
rationale, the Court must step in and protect out-of-state residents who
lack political recourse within the state which is creating the alleged burden.
Some commentators have criticized the free-trade rationale and contended
that the lack of representation of out-of-state interests is the only valid
reason for judicial review of state regulations. These commentators
conclude that Congress rather than the courts is better suited to implement the goal of free trade among states.10
Notwithstanding this recognized analysis, a state regulation.may be
removed from commerce clause scrutiny when Congress uses its affirmative power to sanction state action which would otherwise be struck
3
down under the traditional dormant commerce clause analysis. ' Congress may sanction this impermissible state regulation for the simple
reason that the commerce clause is an express grant of power to Congress, and the dormant aspects of the commerce clause limit only a state's
32
regulatory power, not Congress' ability to act. For example, through
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress has declared that state taxation
28. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935) (striking down
a New York statute which made it unlawful to purchase out-of-state milk priced
less than the price required by New York statute).
29. Underlying the stated rule has been the thought, often expressed in
judicial opinion, that when the regulation is of such a character that its
burden falls principally upon those without the state, legislative action is
not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are normally
exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests within the state.
South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2 (1938).
30. In the context of commerce clause adjudication, the central question
is whether a legislature representative of the people whose significant interests are affected, made the decision. If this question can be answered
affirmatively, the legislative decision may be presumed to be legitimate, and
the citizenry afforded equal concern and respect. The court would have no
further role in the matter.
O'Fallon, The Commerce Clause: A Theoretical Comment, 61 OR. L. REV. 395,
400 (1982). See also Eule, supra note 27, at 442 (Judicial intervention should take
place only when the participatory process has failed.); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND

DISTRUST 83-84 (1980) (The self-operating dimension of the commerce clause grew
out of the need to protect the politically powerless.).
31. See supra note 4.
32. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
213 (1983).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

and regulation of the insurance business is permissible, and that
congressional silence is not to be construed against state regulation.3"
This act of Congress was promulgated in response to the Court's declaration that interstate insurance transactions were interstate commerce and,
therefore, governed by the commerce clause.3 ' Thus, a state can tax and
regulate the insurance industry despite the burdens imposed on interstate
commerce.
Prior to Wunnicke, the Court suggested that it generally looked for
express congressional approval when that body has mandated otherwise
impermissible state action." The Court refused to speculate on congressional motive absent a stated intent to remove the state action from
commerce clause scrutiny.3" Nonetheless, when the Court found that Congress had allowed state action, the inquiry ceased. 7
Another threshold inquiry which may remove state action from commerce clause scrutiny is the market-participant doctrine, first enunciated
in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp."8 The market-participant doctrine
removes state action from commerce clause scrutiny when the state
directly participates in the interstate market as opposed to simply
regulating the market."
In Alexandria Scrap the Supreme Court reviewed a Maryland
program which paid bounties to scrap dealers who disposed of junked
cars. 40 The program was designed to remove the environmental eyesore
created by abandoned automobiles."' In order to qualify for the bounty,
a scrap dealer had to produce documentation that it possessed some type
of title for the abandoned vehicle." The program was allegedly an impermissible burden on interstate commerce because a Maryland dealer
33. McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1982).
34. 91 CONG. REC. 5478 (1945) (statement of Sen. Ferguson); id. at H1085

(statement of Rep. Walter). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408

(1946) (upholding the McCarran-Ferguson Act).
35. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (finding 37
federal statutes giving deference to state control of ground water did not give ap-

proval to a state to impose a burden on interstate commerce concerning ground-

water); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (Federal

Power Act did not validate an otherwise impermissible burden on interstate commerce; it
36.
37.
213, 215
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

simply left standing valid state laws concerning hydroelectric power.).
New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982).
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
(1983).
426 U.S. 794 (1976).

White, 460 U.S. at 208.
Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 797.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 798.
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could produce a simple indemnity agreement to verify title, whereas an
out-of-state dealer had to document title through a certificate of title,
a police certificate, a bill of sale from a police auction or a wrecker's
certificate.4 3 This disparity of treatment gave Maryland processors a clear
advantage in producing vehicles in order to acquire bounties. 44
The Court held that this was not the type of state action with which
the commerce clause was concerned. 45 Thus, the commerce clause did
not restrict Maryland's entry into the scrap market. The Court's reasoning
was not altogether clear," and differing explanations of the Court's
rationale have been advanced.
Some commentators have argued that the doctrine draws support
from the recognition that when the state acts as a private business, rather
than a government entity, it should be afforded the same freedoms
enjoyed by a private business. 47 However, it has also been argued that
the Court's rationale is simply an extension of the state sovereign immunity doctrine to the dormant commerce clause setting.4 8 The state
sovereign immunity doctrine, which was applied to federal action affecting
interstate commerce, saw its genesis the same day in National League
of Cities v. Usery."
43. Id. at 800-01.
44. Id. at 801. (The indemnity agreement is easier to obtain because it is a
matter of standard industry practice.); see also id. at 798-99 (The legislature recognized
the burden created by requiring certain kinds of documentation.).
45. Id. at 810.
46. Id. at 822 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan finds no articulated
principle on which this decision is based.).
47. See Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-State Purchasing Activity Excluded from Commerce Clause Review-Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18 B.C.
INDUS. & Com. L. REv. 893, 905-07 (1977) (arguing that this rationale is insufficient
in that it should be limited to state purchases made for the state's own use, which
is not applicable to the situation in Alexandria Scrap); see also Wells & Hellerstein,
The Governmental-ProprietaryDistinction in ConstitutionalLaw 66 VA. L. Rv. 1073,
1133 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wells & Hellerstein] (Alexandria Scrap may reflect
a state's interest in its own fiscal autonomy.); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew,
339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.) (mem.), aff'd mem. 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
48. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 822 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (National
League of Cities supported state immunity vis-a-vis federal action. Justice Brennan
argued that Alexandria Scrap appears to be a companion case recognizing the same
immunity vis-a-vis the dormant commerce clause.); see also Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 451 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) Justice Powell, the author of the
doctrine, dissented in Reeves, a case that expanded the doctrine. He argued that
the threshold test is whether the state has "undertaken integral government operations in an area of traditional governmental functions. . . ." This excerpt is similar
to the language used in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976).
49. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) Congress could not use its power to regulate interstate
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Another rationale advanced found that but for the state's creation
of the market in interstate commerce, no such market would have existed.
Therefore, the state can burden a market of its own creation, since it
could simply terminate the program entirely.50 This rationale emphasizes
that commerce clause restrictions generally go to the flow of goods in
a pre-existing national market.5" However, the foregoing rationale has
been criticized due to the fact that the record in Alexandria Scrap was
not clear as to whether or not a previous market existed.5"
Despite the somewhat amorphous reasoning supporting the doctrine
in Alexandria Scrap, the Court reaffirmed the market-participant doctrine
in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake.' Therein the Court held that a South Dakota

state-owned cement plant which had previously sold cement to out-ofstate customers could restrict sale of cement to its own citizens during
periods of shortages."' In Reeves, the Court more clearly stated the rationale behind the market-participant exception than it did in AlexandriaScrap. The Court recognized the right of a private trader to choose

the partners with whom it deals." The Court then found that South
Dakota was acting principally as a private seller of goods., 6 Therefore,

the Court held that a state acting as a private seller should enjoy the
same freedoms afforded a private seller.I7 Additionally, the Court found
that notions of state sovereignty supported a state's free choice of trading
partners. 8 However, the Court indicated that some limitations may exist
on the state's ability to enjoy all the freedoms of a private seller. The
Court suggested in dicta that the doctrine may be limited where a natural
resource is involved 9 (timber or coal as opposed to cement), foreign
commerce to affect a state's choice regarding essential decisions in the conduct of
integral governmental functions.
50. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 815 (Stevens, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 817.
52. See id. at 831 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Note, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term, 90 HARv. L. REv. 62 n.27 (1976) (noting that the majority did not adopt
the reasoning of the concurrence because of the limited facts in the record); Note,
Taxes and Bounties Burdening Interstate Commerce: Distinguishing Boston Stock
Exchange from Alexandria Scrap, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 979, 995 n.100 (1977)
(arguing that the issue should not have been raised because the record was devoid
of any facts to warrant the conclusion).
53. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 438-39 (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)).
56. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439-40 (1980).
57. Id.
58. Id.at 438.
59. Id. at 443-44 (A difference exists because cement is the end product of
a complex process involving a conversion of resources into a finished product, whereas
natural resources simply exist in a state by happenstance of their location.).
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commerce is implicated6 0 or where restrictions exist on the resale of the
product. 6 '
The Court again applied the market-participant doctrine in White
2 In White
v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc."
the Mayor of Boston issued an executive order which required that in
all construction projects partially funded by the city, at least half the
workers should be residents of Boston. 3 The Court held that since the
city was at least partially funding the project and that all the workers
were essentially working for the city, the city was participating in the
market and, therefore, not subject to commerce clause prohibitions."'
The Council of Construction Employers argued that since the order
affected subcontractors not in privity of contract' with the city, the
market-participant doctrine did not apply. 6 The Court, however, refused
to limit the doctrine through the use of privity of contract and declined
to discuss whether any other limits existed on the doctrine.'
68
Since the construction projects were partially federally funded,'
White also addressed whether the federal action had any impact on the
outcome of the case. The Court concluded that the federal action did
not affect the holding because the relevant regulations affirmatively
permitted the type of burden the state was imposing."
From this historical background, the analytical approach employed
by courts in deciding dormant commerce clause cases becomes apparent.
First, a court will look for at least some burden on interstate or foreign
commerce. 0 If at least a limited burden is found, a state may argue that
60. Id. at 437 n.9 (the Court suggested that scrutiny may be more rigorous
when foreign commerce is involved).
61. Id. at 444 n. 17 (Once the cement is sold to a South Dakota resident, that
buyer may then resell the cement to an out-of-state resident. No conditions are placed on the disposition of the product after the initial sale.).
62. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
63. Id. at 205-06.
64. Id. at 214-15.
65. "Privity of Contract; That connection or relationship which exists between
two or more contracting parties." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979).
66. Brief for Respondent at 13, White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
67. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,

211 n.7 (1983).
68. Id. at 209 (Approximately $34,000,000 of the project involved Federal Urban Development Action Grants.).
69. Id. at 213.
70. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Implicit in the Court's
articulation of the test in terms of the relative burdens placed on interstate commerce is the notion that the court initially must at least find some burden on interstate commerce in order to continue the analysis.
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the burden has been sanctioned by Congress. 7 This is a-threshold question in the analysis for if a court finds that Congress approved the burden,
no balancing of state and federal interests takes place and the state action
is automatically removed from restrictions of the commerce clause. 2
Second, the state may argue that it is a participant in the market rather
than a market regulator. 3 This is also a threshold test, for if a court
finds that the state is acting as a market participant, the state is not subject
to further commerce clause scrutiny."
Provided a state does not come within these two exceptions, a court
must determine whether the state regulation imposes an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce. Often a court will look at the purpose
of the state regulation. If the goal is economic protectionism, a court
will find the regulation to be per se invalid." However, if there is a
legitimate state purpose, then the court will balance the state interest
against the burden placed on interstate commerce.76 Recently courts have
employed such a balancing test as set out in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc."
Against this backdrop, the Court addressed two issues in SouthCentral Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke. 8 First, the Court
addressed whether Congress had given its implicit approval to an Alaska
primary manufacture requirement." Since the Court answered this
question in the negative,"0 it had to decide whether Alaska was acting
as a market-participant or a market-regulator and whether the burden
placed on interstate and foreign commerce was permissible. 8 '
III.
A.

THE SOUTH-CENTRAL TIMBER DEVELOPMENT, INC. V.

WUNNICKE DECISION

FACTS

In September 1980, the Alaska Department of National Resources
71. See Western & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648 (1981) (An Ohio corporation argued that a retaliatory tax imposed on it by California violated the commerce clause.). See also supra notes 4, 31-37 and accompanying
text.
72. Western & Southern, 451 U.S. at 655. See also supra notes 4, 31-37 and
accompanying text.
73. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
77. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
78. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).

79. Id. at 2240.
80. Id. at 2243.

81. Id.
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gave notice of its intention to sell approximately forty-nine million board
feet of timber" from state-owned land near Icy Cape, Alaska. 3 The notice
of sale, the prospectus, and the contract for sale imposed a primary
manufacture requirement which stipulated that the successful bidder
would be required to partially process the timber within the state."' In
order to comply with this requirement the logs normally had to be converted into cants. 5 An undisputed purpose of the statutory requirement
was to protect Alaska's log processing industry.8
South-Central Timber Development, an Alaska corporation,
purchases, harvests, and ships logs in foreign commerce, ninety percent
of which are shipped to Japan. 7 South-Central does not operate a mill
and normally ships unprocessed logs. Because of this normal practice
82. It should be emphasized that Alaska was solely involved in the sale of
standing timber. The sale of standing timber is distinct from the sale of cut timber
or the sale of some form of processed timber. Id. at 2239.
83. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2238-39.
84. The contract provided:
Section 68. Primary Manufacture. Timber cut under this contract shall not
be transported for primary manufacture outside the State of Alaska without
written approval. of the State. Primary manufacture is defined under 11 AAC
76.130 and the Governor's policy statement of May, 1974.
Id. at 2239 n. 1.
Primary manufacture was defined as follows:
(a) The director may require that primary manufacture of logs, cordwood,
bolts or other similar products be accomplished within the State of Alaska.
(b) The term primary manufacture means manufacture which is first in order
of time or development. When used in relation to sawmilling, it means
(1) the breakdown process wherein logs have been reduced in size by a headsaw or gang saw to the extent that the residual cants, slabs, or planks can
be processed by resaw equipment of the type customarily used in log processing plants; or
(2)manufacture of a product for use without further processing, such as
structural timbers (subject to a firm showing of an order or orders for this
form of product).
(c)Primary manufacture, when used in reference to pulp ventures, means
the breakdown process to a point where the wood fibers have been separated.
Chips made from timber processing wastes shall be considered to have
received primary manufacture. With respect to veneer or plywood production, it means the production of green veneer. Poles and piling, whether
treated or untreated, when manufactured to American National Institute
Standards specifications are considered to have received primary manufacture.
Id. at 2239 n.2, (quoting ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, § 76.130 (1974) (repealed
1982) now authorized by ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 11, §§ 71.230, 71.910 (1982)).
85. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2239 (Cants are logs slabbed on at least one side.).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2239 n.4.
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and the demands of the Japanese market, it is not economically feasible
for South-Central to have logs processed in Alaska and then shipped
to Japan.8 8 Prior to the scheduled sale, South-Central brought suit in

federal district court seeking an injunction to prevent the sale from taking
place, arguing that the primary manufacture requirement violated the

negative implications of the commerce clause. 89
The district court granted South-Central's motion for summary judgment holding that Alaska's policy of primary manufacture was

unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 90 The district court found
that Congress had not consented to Alaska's program simply through

a parallel federal policy which imposed a similar primary manufacture
requirement on timber cut from the National Forest System lands in
Alaska. 9 ' The district court also held that the state's primary manufac-

ture requirement went beyond the Alexandria Scrap exception in that

a natural resource was involved. Finally, the statute was declared per
se invalid since its purpose was pure and simple economic protectionism.9 3
Alaska appealed and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that in light of a federal policy which restricted interstate
shipment of timber from federal lands in favor of local processing, Congress had given its implicit approval to Alaska's policy and Alaska could

validly enact that policy.9 ' Since the court held that Congress had acted
to validate the Alaska policy, it did not address the market-participant

88. Id. at 2239 n.5. See also Brief for Respondent at 37, South-Central Timber
Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984) (South-Central operated a mill at
one time, but was unwilling to invest enough money to maintain its operation consistent with Alaska's pollution laws. Hence, Alaska characterized South-Central's injury as a "self-inflicted wound.").
89. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139 (D. Alaska
1981).
90. Id. at 141.
91. Id. at 144.
92. Id. at 143 (citing Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 51, 71
(1980)).
93. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. at 143-44.
94. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir.
1982). The federal policy provided that:
Unprocessed timber from the National Forest System Lands in Alaska may
not be exported from the United States or shipped to other states without
prior approval of the regional forester. This requirement is necessary to
ensure the development and continued existence of adequate wood processing capacity in that State for the sustained utilization of timber from National
Forests which are geographically isolated from other processing facilities.
36 C.F.R. § 223.10(c) (1981).
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issue."' The Supreme Court granted South-Central's petition for
certiorari."
B.

DECISION

The Supreme Court, per Justice White, reversed the decision of the
court of appeals. First, concerning whether a state policy may be removed
from commerce clause scrutiny by the implicit approval of Congress,
the Court held that a parallel federal policy was not a sufficient indicium
of congressional intent to remove the state from the reach of the commerce clause.9 7 The Court found that in order for a state policy to be
affirmatively permitted by Congress, the intent of Congress to do so must
be unmistakably clear.9 8
Next, the Court decided that the Alaska primary manufacture
requirement did not fall within the market-participant exception.9 9 The
Court held that three factors removed the Alaska scheme from the marketparticipant exception. First, the policy affected foreign commerce, an
area where commerce clause scrutiny is stricter than when only interstate
commerce is affected. 1 0 Second, the state policy affected the distribution of a natural resource which was in the state by mere happenstance.""'
Finally, Alaska imposed restrictions on commerce beyond the market
within which it was a participant.' 2 Since the express approval and
market-participant doctrines were inapplicable, the Court then struck
down the regulation, holding that it fell within the rule of virtual per
se invalidity.'0 3
C.

ANALYSIS

a.

Congressional Approval Issue

In discussing whether Congress may implicitly approve otherwise
impermissible state action, the Court began with the established premise

95. LeResche, 693 F.2d at 892.
96. 104 S. Ct. 231 (1983).
97. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2243 (1984).
98. Id. at 2242.
99. Id. at 2247.
100. Id. at 2245. See also supra note 26 and accompanying text.
101. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
102. Id. at 2246-47.
103. Id. at 2247. See Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1974) (Where
the state goal is simple economic protectionism, and at least an incidental burden
is placed on interstate commerce, the Court has established a rule of virtual per
se invalidity.).
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that the commerce clause has long acted as a limitation on a state's ability
to enact laws which substantially burden interstate or foreign
commerce.'10 However, the Court recognized that Congress may permit
states to regulate interstate or foreign commerce in a manner which, in
the absence of congressional authorization, would not otherwise be
permitted.' 05
The Court utilized these principles to analyze the opinion of the court
of appeals. The court of appeals held that express authorization of the
state action was not always necessary when federal policy was clearly
articulated and the state policy parallels the federal policy. I" The Supreme
Court agreed that federal policy herein was clearly delineated.'10 However,
the Court found no support for the conclusion that because a federal
policy is clearly delineated, a state is authorized to enact a parallel policy
which independently burdens interstate or foreign commerce.' 8 The Court
noted that in most cases it has looked for an express statement of Congress
mandating the state action and has struck down regulations when that
express statement did not appear.'0 9
Next, the Court addressed Alaska's argument that the implicit
approval theory was supported by White v. Massachusetts Council of
ConstructionEmployers, Inc." 0 Alaska argued that White stood for the
proposition that Congress may affirmatively permit, without express
approval, a state regulation which burdens interstate commerce because
the White opinion never mentioned that express approval was required.'
The Court disagreed, finding instead that if White had held that federal
policy implicitly authorized the executive order, the Court would have
2 Thus, the absence of express
never reached the market-participant issue. ",
approval language did not change the fact that congressional intent to
permit parochial state legislation must be unmistakably clear.",
104. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2240. See also supra note 3.
105. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2240. See also supra note 4.
106. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890.
107. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2241.
108. Id. at 2243. Indeed, the court of appeals did not cite any precedent in
suppori of its implicit approval theory. LeResche, 693 F.2d 890.
109. Id. at 2242. See also supra note 35.

110. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
11. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2242.
112. Id. In fact when White speaks of whether Congress affirmatively permitted a burden on interstate commerce it is only speaking to the part of the project
which was federally funded. That is why the Court had to continue and decide the
market-participant issue to the portion of the project that was funded by the city.
White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 209-15
(1983).
113. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2242. Express language approving the burden on

1984:1551

DORMANT COMMERCE CLA USE

In support of requiring more than implicit approval, the Court
pointed out that the danger of burdensome state regulation stems from
the fact that often the party which is adversely affected is without
representation in the state.' 4 Unlike a state legislature, Congress acts
for the whole country and all interests are represented." 5 In failing to
adopt the Ninth Circuit's implicit approval theory, the Court recognized
that by requiring express congressional approval, all interests are better
assured representation.',
While lack of representation is a valid reason for invoking the
dormant commerce clause," 7 it may not support the decision here.
Depending on what interests were adversely affected, political recourse
may have existed. If the definition of adversely affected interests is limited
to parties to the suit," then the problem of lack of representation did
not exist. South-Central was an Alaska corporation, had previous dealings with Alaska and therefore was at least presumably not without
political power. Hence, a political mechanism was available to SouthCentral for the protection of its interests. However, interests may be
affected beyond the parties to the suit.' '9 Here, Japanese corporations
engaged in the manufacture of timber are adversely affected by the Alaska
primary manufacture requirement.I" Since foreign interests are affected
and a state's ability to represent foreign interests is particularly suspect,' 2 '
it makes sense that Congress should represent these interests and delegate
the power to the states with only utmost clarity.
b.

Market-Participant issue

Justice White began the analysis of the market-participant issue with
a restatement of the doctrine: "If a state is acting as a market particiinterstate commerce is indeed the best way in which Congress can clearly intend to
remove the state from the reach of the commerce clause.
114. Id. at 2243. See also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
115. See Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2243.
116. Id. See also supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
118. South-Central's interest is fairly clear in that it will be unable to bid on
the contract if the requirement is upheld.
119. See Eule, supra note 27, at 461. Professor Eule notes that in Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, Philadelphia was only a nominal party and did not even file a brief.
The parties who were actually injured were landfill owners in New Jersey, who could
not sell land space to Philadelphia under the New Jersey regulation. Clearly these
landfill owners had recourse to the political processes in New Jersey.
120. If unprocessed logs can not be shipped to Japan, the Japanese corporations engaged in primary manufacture of timber will lose the percentage of business
they normally acquire from Alaska-owned timber.
121. See supra note 26.
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pant, rather than as a market regulator, the dormant commerce clause
places no limitation on its activities." 22 Notwithstanding the general rule,
the Courtrecognized that the full meaning of the doctrine has not been
established.' 2
The Court examined the case precedent surrounding the doctrine
24
The Court
starting with Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.
out
pointing
Scrap,
Alexandria
from
distinguished the present situation
that Maryland was simply a purchaser of scrap, whereas Alaska not only
sold timber, but also dictated what the buyer must do with that timber
after the immediate sale. ' 25 The Court held that Alaska could not utilize
conditions beyond the actual market in
the doctrine when it imposed
26
participated.
which Alaska
This participant/regulator distinction can be seen by looking at how
Alaska created the burden on interstate and foreign commerce. A burden
was created because there was a substantial foreign market for
unprocessed logs which Alaska blocked when it prevented the exporta1 2
7
tion of unprocessed logs via the contractual condition. Second, Alaska's
timber market existed because the natural resource was by happenstance
within the state's boundaries. 2 ' On the other hand, the Maryland bounty
existed through the state's own action and not through the happenstance
location of a natural resource.' 29 Furthermore, Maryland did not impose
30 However, Alaska
any burdens beyond the market which it created.
did not merely participate in its own market, it also imposed conditions
on a private market within which it was not a participant.' I Hence, the
Court limited the market-participant doctrine by holding that a state may

122. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2243.
123. Id.
124. 426 U.S. 794 (1976); see supra notes 38-52 and accompanying text.
125. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2244.
126. Id. The market in which the state participated was the sale of timber. The
market which the state attempted to regulate was the timber processing market. The
state could not accomplish the second regulation via the first participation.
127. Amicus Brief for the United States at 24, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc.
v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
128. LeResche, 511 F. Supp. 139, 143.
129. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 815 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). But see id. at 824 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Although there may
have been a pre-existing market for "hulks," the Alaska situation is nevertheless
distinguishable because the "hulks" are not a natural resource as is the case with
Alaska's timber.).
130. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2244.
131. Id. (The private market affected by the State of Alaska was the timber
processing market.).
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not burden interstate or foreign commerce beyond the specific market
within which it participates.'"
Alaska also argued that its position was supported by Reeves, Inc.
v. Stake.'" The Court responded by using language from the Reeves
opinion to distinguish it from the Alaska situation. 13,The Reeves Court
noted that situations may arise where the market-participant doctrine
would not apply even though the state was essentially participating in
the market.' The Court did not have to decide whether these limits
existed, since the factual situation did not present itself. However, the
Court specifically noted that scrutiny may be more rigorous when the
burden falls on foreign commerce,' 3 when a natural resource as opposed
to a manufactured product is involved'" or when a ban on the resale
of the product exists.' 38 Thus, Reeves suggested that the marketparticipant doctrine could be applied in limited circumstances and that
limitations exist in deciding whether a state can avail itself of the
exception.' 3 ' In the present case, Justice White found that all three of
the limitations existed."" Therefore, he found that Reeves countered
Alaska's argument rather than supported the position. The Court has
previously expressed the view that when a state attempts to hoard its
resources from other less resource-rich states, the dormant commerce
clause is particularly suited to prevent this type of state action."' The
Court has also been particularly suspicious of a state's attempt to regulate
foreign markets."42 These policies offer further support for the Wunnicke Court's ultimate conclusion.
132. Id. at 2246-47.
133. 447 U.S. 429 (1980); see supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
134. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
135. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 444 (1980).
136. Id. at 438 n.9.
137. Id. at 443-44.
138. Id. at 444 n.17.
139. Id. (Since Reeves was decided on the basis of the market-participant issue,
the limitations advanced must go to deciding this issue.).
140. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
141. If the States have such power [to hoard their resources
through regulations affecting interstate commerce] a singular situation might
result. Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the northwest its timber, the mining
states their minerals .... But rather let us say it [the commerce power] is
constituted of the welfare of all the States and that of each State is made
greater by a division of its resources, natural and created, with every other
State, and those of every other state with it. This was the purpose, as it
is the result, of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the
United States.
Oklahoma v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
142. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452-54 (1979)
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Next, Alaska argued that if the city in White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers, Inc. I3 was allowed to condition
hiring contracts which went beyond formal privity, Alaska could at least
impose contractual conditions on parties within formal privity."' The
city in White went beyond formal privity in that the executive order was
also applied to subcontractors not directly contracting with the city.'"I
The White Court justified application of the market-participant doctrine
because in at least a loose sense, all contractors were working for the
city.' 6 Here, the timber buyers were in direct privity of contract with
Alaska. However, the Court refused to draw a distinction based on privity
of contract. Although the doctrine may apply beyond formal privity as
it did in White, the Court stated that this did not mean it necessarily
applied to all situations where the state is in contractual privity with the
party upon whom the burden falls. I 7 The Court held that a limitation
on the market-participant exception should be drawn with regard to the
market within which the state is participating. This limit will not allow
the state to impose conditions on a market within which it is not a participant. ' The Court supported this limitation by analogizing the state as
a seller to a private business as a seller. Whereas a private seller's chief
concern is effecting the immediate transaction, Alaska's main concern
was affecting conditions after the sale.' 9 The Court buttressed this limitation by reference to the law of restraints on alienation and antitrust law.' 50
The key, however, is not that the Court used these doctrines as support,"
but that the market-participant doctrine has always simply protected the
state's activity within a specific market in which the state was a partici-

(noting the need of the federal government to speak with one voice concerning inter-

national
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

trade).
460 U.S. 204 (1983); see supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
White, 460 U.S. at 209.
Id. at 211 n.7.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.

148. Id.

149. Id. at 2246.
150. Id. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220

U.S. 373, 405 (1911) (A drug company's attempt to fix prices on a retail market

beyond the wholesale market within which it sold was an undue restraint on alienation. The Court held that "[w]hatever right the manufacturer may have to project
his control beyond his own sales must depend, not upon an inherent power incident
to production and original ownership, but upon agreement." The analogy here is
that Alaska's ownership of the timber does not allow it to burden interstate commerce beyond its initial sale of the timber.).
151. Wunnicke, 104 S.Ct. at 2248 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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pant and not activity outside that primary market."'5 Therefore, the Court

legitimately drew the line here in order to prevent the state from defeating
the purpose of the commerce clause.'"
Beyond the Court's proffered reasoning there is sound support for

this limitation on the doctrine. In a different constitutional setting, the

Court has held that a state may not condition hiring contracts in favor

of state residents so that in-state businesses will benefit from the development of state-owned resources.I" Although the precise analysis differs,

in both cases the state was attempting to use its natural advantages to
the detriment of out-of-state interests which are without representation

in the state.
Furthermore, Justice Powell, the original author of the marketparticipant exception, expressed the view that the doctrine should be
limited to the situation where a state procures goods for its own use in
performing traditional state functions. Although the Court presently
does not narrow the doctrine to this degree, it does place limits on the
doctrine in line with the original scope of the doctrine.' 5 '
Finding that Alaska was a regulator rather than a participant, the
Court dismissed Alaska's argument that even as a pure regulation, there
152. None of the previous market-participant cases extended the doctrine beyond
the specific market in which the state was a participant. See White v. Massachusetts
Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (limited to the hiring of
those working for the city; in no way are the Alaska processors working for the
state); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (limited to the initial disposition
of cement by the state); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976)
(limited to the state's distribution of bounties).
153. Wunnicke, 104 S.Ct. at 2246. Some line must be drawn in order to prevent the states from using the participation exception when their actual motivation
is regulation for political purposes. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., dissenting) (Justice Powell correctly recognized that often a state does not respond to market
conditions on an economic basis, but rather based on political concerns. Therefore,
to afford a state the freedoms of a private seller when it acts chiefly out of political
or regulatory motivation does not follow.); Amicus Brief for the United States at
23 n.13, South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunicke, 104 S.Ct. 2237 (1984) (noting
that Alaska is giving up an increased price on timber in order to help privatelyowned local processing plants, a regulatory activity which would not be undertaken
by a private seller).
154. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) The Court struck down an Alaska
statute which required that Alaska residents be hired in preference to nonresidents
on projects involving Alaska-owned oil and gas. The Court struck down the statute
as violative of the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV § 2. The Court noted,
hoWever, the mutually reinforcing relationship between the privileges and immunities
clause and the commerce clause.
155. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 447-54 (Powell, J., dissenting).
156. See supra note 152.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

was no burden on interstate commerce."' The Court held that because
of the protectionist nature of the regulation and the substantial burden
placed on foreign commerce, the regulation was per se invalid in that
it blocked "the flow of interstate commerce at a state's borders.S"I The
Court noted that the presence of foreign commerce required an even
stricter scrutiny of the state regulation. "9
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court
rejected the short-lived theory advanced by the Ninth Circuit that Congress may give its implicit approval to burdensome state regulation of
interstate or foreign commerce through a parallel federal policy.I" The
decision reaffirms the policy enunciated in previous cases that the Court
should not be engaged in speculating as to "what Congress probably
had in mind.""' Wunnicke rejected an invitation to engage in such
speculation. Hence, the decision provides to states and Congress a message
that if Congress seeks to approve otherwise impermissible state activities
it should do so explicitly. The decision has ramifications beyond Alaska
in that other states with significant timber resources have similar statutory
primary manufacture requirements." 2
In addition to rejecting the Ninth Circuit's implicit approval theory,
the Court seriously defined and limited the scope of the market-participant
doctrine. The doctrine is clearly confined to the market in which the state
is participating and burdens beyond that specific market will not be
tolerated. "' This limitation of the doctrine is significant because for the
first time the Court has defined the line between participation and regulation with reference to the market affected by the state activity. This decision steps away from what was at least arguably an undue extension of
the doctrine in White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers, Inc. The dissent in White argued that White went beyond
the exception in that the city conditioned contracts with private firms.
This governing of private economic relationships is "the essence of
157. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2247.
158. Id.
159. Id. See supra note 26.
160. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2243.
161. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982).
162. See CAL. [Pub. Res.] CODE § 4650.1 (West 1984) (requiring that primary
manufacture of state-owned timber be accomplished in the United States); IDAHO
CODE § 58-403 (1984) (requiring that primary manufacture of state-owned timber be
accomplished within the state); OR. REv. STAT. § 526.805 (1983) (same as California).
163. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
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regulation."'"64 However, White upheld the state scheme on the rather
thin thread that all the employees were "essentially working for the
city."' 65 Wunnicke retreats from this broad reading of White and maintains that a state cannot avail itself of the market-participant exception
simply by imposing numerous conditions affecting private economic activity on all public contracts.' 6 '
The Court also recognized two additional limitations on the doctrine. The Court intimated that scrutiny of a state's claim that it is a7
participant may be heightened when a natural resource is involved."6
This furthers a policy which seeks to prevent a state from hoarding its
natural resources to the detriment of states which lack such resources. 16
The second limiting principle recognized that when foreign commerce
is involved, the market-participant doctrine may not afford the state full
protection."19 This limitation is necessitated by the Court's recognition
that a state government is particularly unsuited to speak for the nation
regarding foreign affairs.'7 0 Since foreign commerce affects foreign policy
generally, a state should not possess the ability-to dictate national foreign
trade policy. For this reason, commerce clause scrutiny is stricter when
a burden on foreign commerce is alleged.
In Wunnicke all these limiting factors were present. However, the
question remains whether any single factor would remove a state from
the exception. The Court specifically held that when the state regulates
a market in which it was not participating, the market-participant
exception will not apply.' 7 ' Therefore, this limitation will operate by itself
to remove the state from the market-participant exception. However,
as to natural resources and foreign commerce, the Court only considered
these limiting principles.I 2 Therefore, whether such factors acting alone
would remove the state from the exception is not certain. The most that
can be said is that they are limiting factors within the total analysis.
Another related problem remains. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent
164. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
219 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 153.
165. White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
166. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
167. Id.
168. See supra note 141.
169. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
170. See supra note 26.
171. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
172. But see Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause
and State Control of Natural Resources, 1979 Sup. CT. REv. 51, 82 (1980) (arguing
that under certain conditions a state can favor in-state residents in the allocation
of state-owned natural resources).
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suggested that regardless of the Wunnicke decision, Alaska could
accomplish its intended goals by other means.' He maintained that
Alaska could choose to sell its timber to only those companies which
have processing plants in Alaska.'I" He also argued that Alaska could
subsidize its processing industry and thereby lower the cost of processing logs within the state.'" This would presumably provide an incentive
to buyers of unprocessed logs to process the logs in Alaska. This state
subsidization alternative, however, would not burden interstate commerce
since a private buyer remains free to bypass the subsidized market and
sell unprocessed logs. Nevertheless, if Justice Rehnquist is correct that
the problem is simply a formalistic one, it does not follow that the state
should be able to avail itself of the exception whenever it could accomplish
the same goal by other means. In other dormant commerce clause settings the Court has required that the state accomplish its legitimate goals
through means which have the least restrictive effect on interstate
commerce.'"
The problem of undue formalism can also cut the other way and
suggest that the entire market-participant doctrine is suspect in that it
simply allows a state to defeat the goals of the commerce clause by
adopting a different governmental posture. Indeed it has been recognized that a commerce clause analysis does not cease because of the form
of the discrimination adopted by the state.'" Wunnicke does not question the stature of the entire doctrine, but it does place limits on it which
heretofore have not existed.
V.

CONCLUSION

In South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court
rejected a theory advanced by the Ninth Circuit that Congress may
implicitly approve otherwise impermissible state regulation of interstate
and foreign commerce because of the existence of a parallel federal policy.
The Court also retreated from a broad application of the marketparticipant doctrine within dormant commerce clause analysis. The
173. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2249 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
174. Id. It is not entirely settled whether the natural resources distinction mentioned here and in Reeves will by itself remove a state from use of the exception.
See supra note 172.
175. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2249 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
176. Thus, the form of the regulation and/or participation may be important.

See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 354 (noting
that nondiscriminatory alternatives were readily available).
177. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 827 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Wunnicke decision makes clear the exception will not apply if a state
action reaches beyond the immediate market. Likewise, the Court intimated that if a state action concerns natural resources or foreign commerce, the exception may also be unavailable.
ROBERT

A.

LARSEN

EDITOR'S NOTE

As this issue went to print, the Supreme Court decided Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 43 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1985).
Garcia overruled the Court's opinion in National League of Cities
v. Usery. While this does not directly affect the dormant commerce
clause analysis described in this article, it may have some bearing upon
the market-participant exception in so far as that exception is based
upon notions of state sovereignty similar to those recognized in
National League of Cities. (See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying
text.) If, as the court found in Garcia, it was impossible to differentiate between traditional and non-traditional state functions, then it
also might be impossible to distinguish between a state acting as a
regulator and a state acting as a participant. Thus any citations to
National League of Cities should be read with this in mind.

